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Am I Blue? Depressed Mood and the Consequences of Self-Focus
for the Interpretation and Recall of Ambiguous Words
Paula T. Hertel, Lyla EI-Messidi
Trinity University

In two experiments, dysphoric and nondysphoric students
first concentrated on either self-focused or other-focused
phrases and then performed an ostensibly unrelated task
involving the interpretation of homographs with both
personal and impersonal meanings. In Experiment 1, they
constructed sentences for the homographs; dysphoric
students' sentences were more emotionally negative (al
though not more personal) in the self-focused condition than
in the other-focused condition. In Experiment 2, they freely
associated to the homographs, and the percentage of
personal meanings reflected by the associations revealed
an effect of self versus other focus that depended on mood
group. Following free associations, they attempted to recall
the homographs. Dysphoric students (but not nondysphoric
students) recalled a greater percentage of personally inter
preted homographs if they had focused on self than if they
had focused on other matters. In general, these results
suggest that ruminative or self-focused thinking by people in
depressed moods transfers to novel ambiguous situations,
encouraging more negative interpretations and better recall
of personal interpretations.

A MBIGUOUS MEANING in everyday situations
surely is often not recognized as such. Cognitive
habits, established by recent or frequent experi
ence, save us from conscious decisions about
meaning. Along emotional dimensions, habits of
We thank Rebecca Grider, Nancy Liu, jill Nile, and Ben Revilla
for assistance in all phases of the research.
Address correspondence to Paula Hertel, Deparrmenr of
Psychology, Trinity University, 1 Trinity Place, San Anronio, TX
78212, USA; e-mail: phertel@trinity.edu.

0005-7894/06/0259-0268$1.00/0
© 2006 Association for Behavioral
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

and Cognitive Therapies. Published by

positive thinking may cause us to respond optimis
tically, whereas negative habits may cause us to be
more skeptical. And for many people in depressed
or dysphoric moods states, a special category of
negative habits-rumination-may establish ten
dencies to interpret ambiguous events as personally
relevant. As intuitively appealing as the last claim
might be, however, we have not found relevant
evidence in the literature, so we report two
experiments that make a start in this direction.
Our main goal was to demonstrate that the habit of
focusing on oneself establishes personal responses
to potentially impersonal situations.
As a method of instantiating a ruminative habit,
we chose the manipulation created by Nolen
Hoeksema and her colleagues (e.g., Nolen-Hoek
sema & Morrow, 1993). Experimental participants
concentrate on a series of phrases and explore their
meaning, slowly and deliberately, for about 8 min.
Although the originators referred to these tasks as
"rumination" and "distraction," they can be seen
as thought-induction tasks, because the phrases are
either self-focused ("my character and who I strive
to be") or other-focused ( "the smile on the face of
the Mona Lisa" and other perceptual images). By
invoking ruminative habits in the experimental
setting, the self-focused induction should establish
a bias that transfers to the interpretation of
subsequent ambiguous events, whereas the other
focused induction (distraction) should discourage
such transfer. This prediction is guided by a
transfer-appropriate processing framework (Mor
ris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). In the domain of
memory research, the effects of a particular
manipulation at Time 1 on performance at Time
2 are stronger when the tasks on both occasions
evoke similar cognitive processes, in comparison
to dissimilar or mismatched processes. When
words are studied in terms of what they mean
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instead of what they sound like, for example, they
are better recalled in response to meaning-related
cues on a test of explicit memory or more often
produced as associations to meaning-related cues
on a test of implicit memory; however, the reverse
is true when the test cues are phonologically
related to the word (see Blaxton, 1989). Processes
that are similar across two occasions are deemed
transfer-appropriate.
According to a transfer-appropriate processing
framework and similar notions about contextual
specificity, the point of view established by a
thought-induction task should transfer to a subse
quent interpretation task to the extent that both
tasks vary along the same dimension. Clearly a
primary dimension in the thought-induction task is
the extent of personal meaning inherent in the
phrases. So we developed a set of homographs, each
with both personal and impersonal meanings (e.g.,
close, console, express, loaf, kind, reflect, well), to
use in the interpretation task. Following a self
focused or other-focused induction, participants
performed tasks on these homographs that allowed
us to determine the nature of their interpretations.
In Experiment 1, they created sentences, and in
Experiment 2, they freely associated. We hypothe
sized that, compared to participants who focused
on other matters in the thought-induction task,
those who focused on the self would express
personal interpretations of the homographs more
frequently, particularly if they were dysphoric. The
self-focused task should activate self-focused habits,
presumably more prevalent in the thinking of
depressed or dysphoric people (see Mor & Win
quist, 2002; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987;
Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998).
In Experiment 2, we followed the free-associa
tion task with a test of free recall of the
homographs to which they associated. The recall
test served as a second measure of focus on the
meaning of the homographs. The more meaning
fully processed homographs should be better
recalled (see Craik & Tulving, 1975), and we
expected that personally interpreted homographs
would be more meaningful to, and therefore
better recalled by, dysphoric participants who
had focused on the self.
A somewhat different question to be addressed in
this paradigm is whether the habit of self-focus, as
called forth by the thought-induction task, influ
ences the emotional valence of interpretations in
dysphoria. For depressed or dysphoric participants,
the thought-induction task often has consequences
similar to a mood-induction task; the self-focused
condition makes them feel more depressed, and the
other-focused condition makes them feel less

depressed (e.g., Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen
Hoeksema, 1998). Moreover, Lyubomirsky et a!.
discovered cognitive consequences of the self
focused induction for the production of negative
autobiographical memories. In keeping with those
findings, as well as the underlying notion that
dysphoric participants' thoughts should be more
emotionally negative during the self-focused induc
tion, we hypothesized that dysphoric participants in
the self-focused condition would produce more
emotionally negative sentences, compared to those
who had recently focused elsewhere. Increased
negativity in the self-focused condition might reflect
mood-congruent processing (if there is evidence for
differential negativity in mood), thought-congruent
processmg (the transfer of cognitive habits), or
both.

Experiment I

In the first experiment, dysphoric and nondy
sphoric students underwent a thought-induction
procedure in which they concentrated on a series of
phrases that were either self-focused or other
focused for approximately 8 min (see Nolen
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Subsequently, on
each of 40 trials of the interpretation task an
interpretation cue was presented, and they were
asked to use this word in a sentence; 60% of
these words were homographs with both personal
and impersonal meanings, and the others were
fillers with one primary meaning. We first
predicted that self-focused thinking would cause
participants, particularly dysphoric participants,
to construct more sentences reflecting personal
meanings of the homographs. Our second predic
tion was that more negatively emotional sentences
would be created by the dysphoric participants
who self-focused.
The interpretation trials were actually designed
to be analogs for the experience of being
reminded of one's previous thoughts while
performing a new task. On 60% of the trials,
prior to the presentation of the interpretation cue,
either a new word or a trigger word from the
induction procedure appeared at the top of the
screen. Participants were asked to indicate whether
this top word-the potential reminder-had oc
curred during the previous induction task. (The
triggers were common to both induction condi
tions.) We did not entertain a specific prediction
regarding the trigger trials, because being occasion
ally reminded of self-focused thoughts might be
sufficient to exert the effect across all trials.
Regardless, the outcome of this manipulation was
uninformative, and therefore we omit most of the
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associated details from the description of materials
(in the interest of mental and physical economy).
Method
PART ICIPANTS AND DESIGN

Undergraduate students were given the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw,
& Emery, 1979) during their introductory psy
chology course to assess their levels of dysphoric
mood. Those who scored lower than 6 and higher
than 9 were recruited for participation, and the
experimenters who interacted with the partici
pants were unaware of their BDI scores. (The
scores of 6 through 9 were avoided in order to
decrease attrition due to changes during the 1-to2-week period between the class administration
and the experimental session. Only 10% of the
recruited dysphoric participants' scores fell below
12, which is akin to a score of 14 on the BDI-II
the cutoff for mild depression; Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996.)
Under a constraint of equal cell sizes and
approximately equal gender distributions, partici
pants were randomly assigned to conditions of the
thought-induction task. Those whose end-of-ses
sion BDI scores placed them out of the original
categories of dysphoric or nondysphoric were
replaced (7 from the dysphoric group and 4 from
the nondysphoric group). The final sample in the
self-focused condition included 18 dysphoric and
18 nondysphoric participants, 10 of whom were
female and 8 male. The other-focused condition
contained 18 participants from each mood catego
ry, 9 of each gender. This final sample of 72
participants excluded the data of 5 additional
participants who failed to comply with instructions
for the sentence-production task.
MATER IALS

Mood forms. In the initial mood form of the
session, participants were asked to rate the extent to
which their feelings "at this moment" corresponded
to each of several adjectives (e.g., dreamy, sad,
angry, elated, curious, depressed) by using a scale of
1 (not at all) to 9 (very) (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998).
The second mood form, given after the induction
phase, consisted of some of the same adjectives,
plus additional ones, but in a different order than
on the previous form. The participants' ratings for
the adjectives sad and depressed were totaled
separately for each form to constitute their two
mood scores.
Thought-induction phrases. Nolen-Hoeksema
and Morrow's (1993) rumination and distraction
phrases were slightly modified to produce 50

phrases in each category (self-focused vs. other
focused, respectively) and displayed one per page
in a booklet. Eight phrases in each set were
constructed to contain identical "trigger" homo
graphs to be used during the interpretation phase
(Brozovich, 2003). For example, participants in the
self-focused condition read, "your character and
who you strive to be" (an original phrase from
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow) whereas those in the
other-focused group read, "a character on a
computer keyboard" (a new phrase of our
invention).
Interpretation cues. Interpretation cues con
sisted of 24 target homographs (not used in the
induction phase) and 16 fillers. The target
homographs were chosen from Twilley, Dixon,
Taylor, and Clark (1994), based on whether at
least one of their meanings was personal and
another impersonal (bitter, blunt, bug, close,
console, deep, desert, down, dump, express, felt,
firm, hound, kind, loaf, reflect, relish, sharp, shed,
stable, strain, trip, vent, well). Those with
extreme differences in interpretation frequencies
were avoided (for those chosen, M
.30 for
personal meaning and .65 for impersonal mean
ing). In order to disguise the nature of the
experiment, 16 filler words with one primary
meaning were selected from Kucera and Francis
(1967) and approximately matched with the
homographs on word frequencies. One random
ized-block order of interpretation cues was used
for all participants. Each block contained three
homographs and two fillers, randomly assigned,
for a total of 40 trials.
=

PRO CEDURE

The session was described as a collection of
independent tasks and questionnaires. First, parti
cipants were asked to fill out the initial mood form
and place it in an envelope to be delivered later to
the supervising faculty member. Then the thought
induction task was described as a pilot for a later
study that would examine the factors that facilitate
concentration, with the implication that questions
would follow. The participants received their
assigned booklets (either self-focused or other
focused) and were asked to read and concentrate
on each phrase in turn for 10 s. They were instructed
not to turn the page until the tape-recorded beep
sounded. When they completed this task, they were
given the second mood form to complete and place
in the envelope with the first form.
Next, we described the purpose of the interpre
tation task as an investigation of sentence con
struction, under conditions in which another,
alternating task is also being performed
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(recognition). All words were presented in bold
black font on a white screen, programmed in
Superlab Pro. We told participants that, because of
this alternating task, on most of the trials a word
would appear at the top of the screen. If a word
appeared at the top (24 of the 40 trials), 3 s were
allotted for the decision of whether the word was
old (from the previous booklet) or new. Partici
pants pressed "v" on the keyboard (relabeled as
"o") for judgments of old and "n" for judgments
of new. In the event that no word appeared at the
top, participants were told to wait for the word at
the bottom of the screen to appear (in 3 s). On
every trial, an interpretation cue (homograph or
filler) appeared at the bottom for 3 s. Participants
were instructed to repeat this word aloud and then
use it in a sentence. They were asked not to
produce very elaborate sentences, but also not to
use uninformative sentences (e.g., It is a bug). After
saying each sentence, they pressed a space bar, and
a +sign at the top of the screen indicated entry into
the next trial. The spoken responses were recorded
on tape and coded later. Participants were given
four practice trials to ensure their understanding of
the procedure before beginning the actual trials, at
which point the experimenter left the room.
At the end of the session, prior to ·debriefing,
participants filled out a second BDI, used to check
whether they still belonged in the same mood
category. They placed it in the envelope that
contained the two mood forms and sealed it.
CODING

Taped responses to homographs during the inter
pretation phase were transcribed verbatim. Two
raters independently coded all transcribed
responses categorically, according to whether the
sentence: (a) reflected personal or impersonal
meaning (98% agreement, K
.95) and (b)
expressed positive, neutral, or negative emotion
(77% agreement).1 All disagreements were resolved
by discussion without reference to condition.
=

Results and Discussion
MOOD SCORES

To examine effects of the thought-induction proce
dure on temporary mood, a mixed design ANOVA
was performed with a within-subjects factor for the

1

We could not compure estimates of

K

for the valence

judgments, because the actual judgments involved in disagreements
between raters were inadverrenrly discarded. When the judgments
are conceptualized as negative versus nonnegative, agreement was

96%. The clear majority of disagreements thus concerned the
difference between neutral and positive sentences.

timing of the form {pre- vs. post-induction) and
between-subjects factors for mood group (nondy
sphoric vs. dysphoric) and thought induction
condition (self-focused vs. other-focused). The
main effect for mood group was significant, f(l,
68)
37.60, MSE
20.48, p < .001. Means are
reported in Table 1. The only other significant effect
was the three-way interaction of group by induction
by timing, F(l, 68) 4.35, MSE 2.68, p .041.
The simple interaction of timing and induction was
nonsignificant for nondysphoric participants
(p
.231) and only marginally significant for
dysphoric participants, f (1 , 34)
3.14,
MSE
2.34, p
.085. As seen in Table 1, the
pattern of means is in line with the typical finding
that the self-focused induction impairs mood in
dysphoria and the other-focused induction
improves mood; however, the other-focused group
started out with higher scores on the pretest.
Clearly, the moods of the self-focused dysphoric
participants at post-induction were no more nega
tive than the relevant comparison scores.
=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

PER CEN TAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS
INTERPRETED PERSONALLY

The primary dependent variable used to evaluate
the consequences of self-focused attention was the
percentage of homographs interpreted personally,
instead of impersonally, according to the meaning
expressed in the participants' sentences. This
measure was submitted to a mixed design
AN OYA, with between-subjects factors for mood
group and induction procedure and a within
subjects factor for type of trial. Type of trial refers
to whether triggers, new words, or nothing
appeared at the top of the screen prior to the
interpretation cue appearing at the bottom. All
effects in this design were nonsignificant, p > .10.
As is clear in the pattern of means presented in
Table 1, our hypothesis concerning transfer effects
of the thought induction procedure, alone or
interacting with mood group, received no support,
Fs < 1.0.
Dysphoric participants' personal interpretations
of the homographs were more frequent than the
normative f requency: (. 30), t ( 35)
4.20,
SE
2.290, p < .001. However, the same can be
said of the nondysphoric participants: t (35) 2.53,
SE 1.975, p .016.
As an aside before turning away from this
measure, we report a correlation between the
percentage of homographs interpreted personally
and scores on the Rumination on Sadness Scale
(Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000), which
had also been administered in the introductory
psychology classes and coded for this purpose. The
=

=

=

=

=
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Table 1
Means (Standard Deviations) in Experiment 1
Dysphoric

Nondysphoric

Other-focused

Self-focused

Other-focused

Self-focused

10.4 (3.5)

Pre-induction

5.6 (3.2)

4.0 (1.8)

9.3 (4.1)

Post-induction

5.6 (3.2)

5.0 (2.4)

9.6 (4.1)

9.4 (4.3)

Session BDI scores

3.4 (1.8)

2.2 (1.2)

16.2 (6.4)

17.0 (6.5)

35.3 (11.4)

34.7 (12.6)

40.2 (13.2)

39.0 (13.6)

Percentage personal

Note.

n

=

18. "Percentage personal" refers to the percentage of homographs that were interpreted personally.

correla tion was modest but significant, r (70) .26,
p
.029, and indicates that participants who
reportedly ruminate when they are sad tended to
interpret homographs personally.
=

=

PERCENTAGE OF SENTENCES WITH
NEGATI V E EMOTIONAL MEANING

The percentage of sentences that were judged to be
emotionally negative served as the next dependent
variable in an ANOVA, with between-subjects
factors for mood group and induction procedure.
The main effect of induction procedure was
significant, F (1, 68)
6.22, MSE
129.9,
p .015. Although this effect did not depend on
mood group (F < 1.0), our hypothesis pertained to
dysphoric participants in particular, and therefore
we performed a priori tests of the effect within
each mood group. Clearly, self-focused thoughts
made interpretations more negative in the dys
phoric group, t (34)
2.29, SE 3.963, p .028.
As shown in Figure 1, 39% of interpretations in
the self-focused condition were negative
(SD
12.78), on average, compared to 30% in
the other-focused condition (SD
10.92). The
corresponding mean percentages in the nondy
sphoric group were 36 and 32 (SDs
12.22
and 9.35)-a difference that was not significant,
2
t (34)
1.19, SE
3.627, p
.243. Overall,
the percentage of negative interpretations was
significantly correlated with the percentage of
personal interpretations, r (70)
.31, p
.009.
=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

reminders might even interfere by establishing too
analytic a set for the transfer of a self-focused
perspective. At least one nondysphoric participant
(whose data were set aside) had created several
sentences containing both meanings of the homo
graphs. Also following that line of reasoning, we
changed the interpretation task to one that fosters a
less analytic set: free association. (Because we
requested one-word responses, the valence of the
association was heavily constrained by the valence
of the homograph itself, and so the hypothesis
about emotional valence could not be adequately
separated from the hypothesis about personal
meaning.)
Finally, a new procedure was included in Exper
iment 2. Following the interpretation task, we
surprised the participants with a request to recall
the cues for free association. Perhaps even more
important than the degree of personal meaning
initially taken from an ambiguous event is the degree
to which that personal interpretation is subsequently
remembered. The prediction for this task was that
dysphoric students in particular should recall more
of the homographs that they had interpreted

I

=

=

=

=

=

=

In a second attempt to examine potential transfer
effects of cognitive habits, Experiment 2 was
conducted without reminders about the induction
task. With hindsight, we were concerned that

=

GJ

IS Other-focused

.:: 30
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g' 25

'if-

c:
m
GJ

:E

20
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10
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3.12, MSE

=

210.52, p

<

main effect of induction,

.10. The percentage was higher

within each mood group approached significance, p

>

Mood Group

F("l,

in the other-focused condition, but neither simple main effect

.15. A

FIGURE
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Mean percentages of sentences judged to be

negatively emotional in each mood group and condition of the

similar analysis performed on the percentage of positive inrerpreta

thought-induction task (Experiment

tions revealed no significant effects, Fs

standard errors.

<

1.0.

I

35

on the percentage of neutral interpretations revealed

only a marginally significant
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D Self-focused
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z
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Error bars represent
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personally if their self-focusing habits had been
activated by the induction procedure. Such an
outcome would reflect a stronger focus on personal
meaning in the interpretations.
Method
PARTICIPANTS AN D DESIGN

Using the same selection procedure and criteria as
in Experiment 1, we randomly assigned dysphoric
and nondysphoric participants to the self-focused
and other-focused thought-induction task, with the
constraint of equal cell sizes. After the data from
participants who changed their mood conditions
were set aside (n = 6 in each mood group), 8 female
and 8 male students participated in each combina
tion of mood group and induction task, for a total
of 64 participants.
MATERIALS AN D PRO CEDURE

All materials and procedures were identical to
those in Experiment 1, with the following
exceptions. In the interpretation task, 12 fillers
and 12 homographs (bitter, blue, console, deep,
dump, express, glare, odd, stable, tear, vent, and
well) were arranged in a randomized block order,
with each block containing two fillers and two
homographs. (With the omission of the remin
ders, the design required fewer homographs;
fewer were also preferred on the basis of reduced
awareness of their homographic quality.) The
words were presented for 2 s each, followed by a
blank screen. Participants were instructed to read
each word aloud and then to blurt out the first
two words that came to mind. Although we
planned to evaluate the meaning of the first word
only, we requested two words to reduce any
tendency to choose a "best" response. After
producing two responses, participants advanced
the program to the next trial. All responses were
taped, with the experimenter absent from the
room.
Another change from Experiment 1 was the
inclusion of three filler tasks at the very beginning

Table

of the session, in order to make a more convincing
case for the session consisting of a collection of
unrelated tasks. These tasks included 2 min of
spatial problem-solving, 5 min of finding hidden
objects in pictures, and a bogus test of color
preferences. They were followed by the first mood
form, the thought-induction task, the second mood
form, and the free-association test. (Participants
were told that their associations would guide
choices for later experiments.) Then, participants
were handed a sheet of blank paper and asked to
recall the cues for association-the words presented
on the screen during the previous task. Unlimited
time was allowed. The final procedure was the
administration of the BDl.
The first responses to homographs during the
free-association task were transcribed from the tape
and independently coded by two raters for the
extent to which they reflected personal or imper
sonal meaning. The raters agreed about 96% of the
responses (K = .92) and resolved their disagree
ments without reference to condition.
Results and Discussion
MOOD SCORES

As in Experiment 1, the ratings on the "sad" and
"depressed" scales were summed for each mood
form, although three participants (1 dysphoric and
2 nondysphoric) were missing rating data, having
failed to turn over the pages. These scores were
submitted to a mixed design ANOVA, with
between-subjects factors for mood group and
induction task and a within-subjects factor for
timing (pre- and post-induction). Dysphoric stu
dents produced higher scores, regardless of timing
or induction, f(1, 57)
47.33, MSE
16.16,
p < .001. Means are presented in Table 2. The only
other significant effect was the interaction of mood
group and timing, F(l, 57) = 6.69, MSE
3.55,
p
.012. Both mood groups' scores tended to
regress to the overall mean. Again, the dysphoric
data did not replicate Nolen-Hoeksema and Mor
row's (1993) results.
=

=

=

2

Means (Standard Deviations) in Experiment

2

Nondysphoric

Pre-induction
Post-induction
Session BDI scores
Percentage personal

Note.

=

n

=

Dysphoric

Self-focused

Other-focused

Self-focused

Other-focused

3.4 (1.6)
5.1 (3.0)
2.5 (1.9)
45.0 (22.0)

4.9 (2.5)
5.9 (3.5)
2.9 (2.2)
54.9 (16.3)

10.0 (3.7)
10.1 (3.1)
13.6 (4.3)
51.8 (18.4)

10.2 (3.7)
9.2 (3.4)
15.8 (5.2)
44.6 (19.1)

16, but only 15 for mood ratings in the nondysphoric condition and in the dysphoric/self condition. "Percentage personal" refers to

the percentage of homographs that were interpreted personally.
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25

ID

Self-focused

p .20; in the nondysphoric group, F (1, 28)
MSE 276.37, p .10.

� Other-focused

=

=

20

"C

�
iii
(..) 15
Gl
a:
�
0
c: 10
ltl
Gl
:!:
5

=

2.83,

=

PERCENTAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS RECALLED

The percentages of personally interpreted homo
graphs that were subsequently recalled were sub
mitted to an ANOVA with between-subjects factors
for mood group, induction procedure, and gender.
The interaction of induction procedure with mood
g r o u p w a s significant, F ( 1, 56)
4.52,
MSE
100.48, p
.038. Illustrated in Figure 2,
dysphoric participants assigned to self-focus
recalled a higher percentage than did those assigned
to focus on other matters (M
20% vs. 11%,
SDs 9.34 and 9.08, respectively), F (l, 28) 8.31,
MSE
73.87, p
.007. The corresponding
d i f f e r e n c e for n o n d y s p h o r i c p a r t i c i p a n t s
(M
14% vs. 16%, SDs
12.24 and 11.64,
4
respectively) was nonsignificant, F < 1.0. (In an
analysis of the percentage of impersonally inter
preted homographs recalled, all effects were non
significant, Fs < 1.0, M 17%.)
=

0 -'----'----

=

Nondysphoric

Dysphoric

Mood Group

=

=

FIGURE 2

Mean percentages of personally interpreted homo

graphs recalled in each mood group and condition of the thought
induction task (Experiment 2). Enror bars represent standard
errors.

=

=

=

=

=

PERCENTAGE OF HOMOGRAPHS
I NTER PRETED PERSONAL LY

=

=

Due to a programming error on one computer, one
of the homographs was not displayed during the
free association task for 30 participants (7 nondy
sphoric self-focused, 8 nondysphoric other-focused,
8 dysphoric self-focused, and 7 dysphoric other
focused). Therefore, the dependent measure was the
percentage of homographs interpreted personally,
out of either 11 or 12 total. An initial analysis
included "computer" as a factor and revealed no
significant effects associated with the programming
error. Therefore, this percentage was submitted to
an A N OVA with between-subjects factors for mood
group, induction procedure, and gender. Gender
was included in the design as a means of reducing
error variance; we held no expectations about the
interaction of gender with the variables of interest. 3
As shown in Table 2, the interaction of
mood group with induction condition was
significant, F (1, 56)
4.55, MSE
259.54,
p
.037. Dysphoric students interpreted homo
graphs personally more frequently following the
self-focused induction, whereas nondysphoric stu
dents showed the opposite pattern. However, these
simple main effects were nonsignificant; in the
dysphoric group, F (1, 28)
1.75, MSE 242.71,
=

=

=

=

General Discussion

Together, these two experiments provide some useful
evidence concerning the cognitive consequences of
self-focused attention for the interpretation of
ambiguous words by dysphoric students. In Exper
iment 1, a period of self-focus led them to construct
more emotionally negative sentences, although not
ones that implicated more personal interpretations of
the homographs. In Experiment 2, self-focus tended
to cause more personal interpretations, at least in
contrast to the opposite pattern shown by nondy
sphoric students. Moreover, when the dysphoric
students were self-focused they later recalled a higher
percentage of personally interpreted homographs.
We address each finding in turn.
In Experiment 1, self-focused dysphoric students
constructed more emotionally negative sentences in
response to the homographs than did those in the
other-focused condition. This effect might be
thought of as a mood-congruent effect if the self
focused induction had actually caused dysphoric
4

=

The only significant effect involving gender in the analysis of

recall data was the three-way interaction of gender, induction, and
mood group, F( I , 56)
3

=

9.54, MSE

=

100.48, p

=

.003. Follow-up

rests, to be interpreted cautiously because the cell sizes were small
Gender was also initially included as a factor in the Experiment

(11

=

8), indicated that the pattern illustrated in Figure 2 was

1 analyses and then excluded because it did not ufficiently reduce

exaggerated for male students and nor significant for female

error variance to change any of the reponed outcomes.

students. Again, we included the gender factor as a method of

In

Experiment 2, the inclusion of gender helped to increase power

reducing error variance. Even without irs inclusion, however, the

in analyses of interpretations. Female students made more personal

interaction of induction and mood group was significant, F(l,

113.74, p

60)

MSE

effect of induction procedure within the dysphoric group, F(1,

=

259.54, p

nonsignificant, Fs

<

<

F(l, 56) = 26.09,
.001. All other effects involving gender were
1.0.

3.99, MSE

free associations than did male students,

30)

=

=

7.24, MSE

=

=

84.82, p

=

=

.050; and so was the simple main

.012.
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parttctpants to feel sadder than if they had been

Another potentially useful procedure would be to

distracted by other matters. Because it did not, it is

recruit and assign participants according to their

probably better to think of the effect as primarily

tendency to ruminate; one might thereby find

cognitive instead of affective. Thinking unhappy

effects of thought induction for those who typically

thoughts about self likely transferred to thinking

ruminate and not

negative thoughts about the homographs. Although

Experiment 1 did reveal a modest but significant

the interaction of induction procedure with mood

relationship between rumination and the tendency

group was nonsignificant, the sentences created by

to make personal interpretations.

for

others. In that vein,

nondysphoric students did not reveal a significant

In the meantime, until such research is per

effect of thought induction. Nevertheless, the

formed, we emphasize the recall data in Experiment

overall level of negativity in both mood groups

2, which provide solid evidence for the transfer of

was sizable. In that regard it is important to keep in

cognitive habits along a self-referential or person
oriented dimension. The self-focused dysphoric

mind that the valence of the sentence must have
depended in part on the valence of the homographs'

participants recalled a higher percentage of the

meanings, and clearly we chose a number of

homographs that they had interpreted personally,

homographs with emotionally negative interpreta

compared to the other-focused dysphoric partici

tions. The percentage of negative interpretations

pants. In short, although they did not make

was significantly correlated with the percentage of

significantly more personal interpretations in the

personal interpretations.

self-focused condition, they seemed to have made

Turning now to the personal versus impersonal
nature of the homographs' meanings, we conclude

them at a more meaningful or attentive level that
facilitated their subsequent recall.

that Experiment 1 provided no support for the

The effect on free recall provides an experimental

main hypothesis concerning the transfer of self

model for aspects of ruminative remembering.

focusing effects. The sentences constructed by

When we ruminate about our experience we

dysphoric

participants expressed the personal

construct processing episodes that themselves are

meanings of the homographs nondifferentially in

remembered, potentially in place of the original

the

no more

episode. So, even though reasoning from homo

frequently than did the sentences produced by

graphic free associations to real-life events is a

two

induction conditions

and

nondysphoric students. If and when such transfer

stretch, it is tempting to speculate that the personal

of personal focus occurs, we now surmise that it is

interpretation is the "event" that is subsequently

likely to be automatically achieved and potentially

recalled,

disrupted by other cognitive concerns. Perhaps the

depressive rumination and self-focus. In the course

particularly well under conditions of

use of reminders during the interpretation task

of habitual cognition, recall of personal interpreta

interfered by encouraging participants to monitor

tions potentially returns the "favor" by exacerbat

their thoughts. Even the very task of creating

ing future tendencies to "take things personally."

sentences might itself be too "forced" to reflect the

The two experiments described in this report are

operation of relatively automatic habits. In side
stepping these possibilities, we excluded reminders

novel in their exploration of cognitive consequences
of self-focused thoughts for the tendency to "take

and employed a more reflexive interpretation task

things personally." By using Nolen-Hoeksema and

in Experiment 2.

Morrow's (1993) rumination and distraction pro

In

Experiment 2,

the

effect of self-focus,

cedures, previous research has explored the cogni

although not significant for the dysphoric partici

tive consequences of self-focused thinking on other

pants, was in the hypothesized direction, in

measures of cognition in depression and dysphoria.

contrast to the opposite direction in the nondy

We mention just a few examples. Dysphoric

sphoric group. The interaction was significant, but
due in part to low variance associated with the

tion (compared to those who were other-focused)

main effect of induction, the interaction did not

have been shown to experience an enhanced sense

partition into significant simple main effects within

of insightfulness but greater pessimism about

students who have undergone a self-focused induc

either mood group. Responses were quite variable;

positive events in their future, and they have been

therefore power was low. Among factors possibly

found to generate fewer effective solutions to

responsible for low power was the small separation

interpersonal problems and more negative

between the mood groups. In particular, the scores

13.6). Obviously,

responses to imagined problem situations (Lyubor
mirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995). Evidence
for effects on memory tasks has also been obtained

that outcome suggests the collection of data from

by using thought-induction procedures. A dyspho

more clearly depressed individuals in the future.

ria-related disruption in the

on the end-of-session BDI in the self-focused
condition fell to low levels (M

=

more attention-

S E LF - F O C U S E D

ATTENTI O N

demanding, deliberate component of remembering
was found fol lowing the self-focused but not the
other-focused induction ( Hertel, 1 99 8 ) . A lso, mea
s u res of auto b i ograp h ic a l memory h a ve been
a ffected by thought-induction procedu res. Com
pared to the self-focused procedure, the other
foc used or d istracting procedure reduced the
n u m ber of categ<:>rica l , overly general memories

A N D

DY S P H O R I A

treatment,

it
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m i ght be j u st a s i m porta n t to

und ersta nd the cogniti ve h a bits of individua l s
w h o are depressed o r a nxious a s it is to find the
right di agnostic category.

I m plicati ons for Clin ical Practice

reca l led by dysphoric and depressed participa nts
(Watkins, Teasdale, & Wi l l iams, 2000), as wel l a s
t h e negativity of such memories (Lyubomirsky et
a l . , 1 99 8 ) .

A lthough only a few studies have found evidence o f
in terpreti ve b i a ses in depressed o r dysphoric
sam ples, such biases a re taken for granted by
practicing psychotherapists. Cha nging the cognitive
h a b i ts of depressed c l i ents h a s l o n g been a

More genera l ly, the cu rrent experiments a re
a mong the few to find experimenta l evidence of

o f those practices, k nown a s cognitive restructur

interpretive biases i n dysphoria and depression (see
M athews & MacLeod, 2005 ) . Probably the clea rest
evidence of i nterpretive bias in dysphoria was
revealed quite indirectly. Lawson, MacLeod, and
H a m mond (2002) measured the blink reflex in

ing, c a l l to the client's attention the m ultiple
interpretations of a m biguous events in a n effort to
encourage i m personal interpretations (e.g., Is it
possi ble that she didn't return your call because she
is out of town, not because she is avoiding you ? ) .

response to noise presented during an imagery tas k .
Participants i maged situations evoked b y aura lly

Clearly it is impossible to cha nge h a b its without

presented a m biguous and nona m b iguous words.

cornerstone of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Some

first revea li ng them. However, one drawback to a
therapeutic focus on interpretations is the possible
strengthening of the habit to i nterpret persona l l y,
particu l a rly when homework for cognitive restruc

Dysphoric participants produced particul a rly am
plified blink reflexes during the imaging of emo
tion a l l y negative words and similarl y a m p l i fied
reflexes d uring the imaging of a m biguous words

turing is difficult to get under way. Under the l atter
conditions, the transfer-a ppropriate processing

with possible negative interpretations. According to
t h e s e r e s u l t s , a s wel l as t h e c u rrent report,

approach suggests a potentia l l y useful a lternative.
The al ternative is simply to sidestep cognitive h a b its

procedures might be more likely to reveal interpre
tive b iases to the extent that they inv ite h a bitual
processes (see Hertel, 2004 ).

instead of arguing with the m . D i recting clients who
rum i nate un productively to notice and s ubsequent
ly turn their attention to unrelated but compe l l ing

Dysphoria is a term that refers to nondiagnosed
negative a ffect, of the sort that is measured by the

topics, idea l ly agreed upon in adva nce, takes
ad vantage of the u sefu l ness of distraction i n

BDl. Scores on the BDI are highly correlated with

possibly i mprovi ng mood (Nolen-Hoeksema &

trait a n xiety measures. P l a i nly, anxiety experienced
by our dysphoric participa nts might be at least

Morrow, 1 9 93 ) and wea kening the ruminative
cycle. Even the brute-force method of suppressing

partly responsible for the pattern of results, because
interpretive biases h a ve frequently been demon

u ndesirable thoughts has been shown to decrease
their su bsequent occurrence, particularly by indivi

strated in anxiety (e.g., Eysenck, Mogg, May,
Richards, & Mathews, 1 99 1 ; MacLeod & Cohen,

d u a ls with major depressive d isorder (e.g., Joor
m a n n , H e rte l , Brozo v i c h , & G o t l i b , 2 0 0 5 ) .

1 99 3 ) . Recently, anx iety-rela ted interpretive biases
have been successfu l l y modeled in nonanxious

Thought su bstitutes a re helpfu l in this process, a t

groups (e.g., M athews & Mack i ntosh, 2000) .
Like o u r use of the thought-ind uction tasks, these
experiments developed interpretive h a b its in an
i nitial phase, which subsequently produced transfer
e ffects, even on d i s s i m i l a r tasks ( e . g . , Hertel,
M athews, Peterson, & Ki ntner, 2003) and fo l low
ing delays (Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005 ) .
I t is worth considering t ha t transfer-appropriate
processes operating from one task to a nother might
ulti mately be more i mportant to understanding
biases than whether the individual is primarily
depressed o r a n xious, especia l l y considering the
overlap i n symptoms ( see Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) .
Moreover, i n deciding a bout nonpha rmacologica l

least in nondiagnosed samples ( Hertel & Calca
terra, 200 5 ) . Some suppressed thoughts seem to
rebound later on their own steam (Wegner, 1 994 ),
but clea rly
understand
others can
inaccessible

much work rem a i n s if we a re to
why some seem to rebound whereas
be su ppressed to the point o f being
during intentional reca l l (Joormann et

a l . , 2005 ) .
O f course, spec u lations a bout therapeutic prac
tices wander far from the data we present, but our
investigation and these speculations both derive
from an understa nding of ruminative think i ng as
habit in a rather old-fash ioned behavioral sense.
The way to extinguish one behavior is to practice
doing someth ing d i fferent i nstea d . The way to stop
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perce1vmg and remembering the ambiguous as
personal is to do something that turns the focus of
attention away from self.

E L - M E SS I D I

depressed mood on retrieval of autobiographical memo
ries. journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
1 6 6- 1 77.
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. ( 1 99 3 ) . Self-perpetu
ating properties of dysphoric rumination. journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 339-349.
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